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Abstract The paper deals with recent deviations from the shared values of con-
stitutionalism towards a kind of ‘populist, illiberal constitutionalism’ introduced by
Hungary’s new constitution in 2011. The populism of FIDESZ was directed against
all elites, including the ones that designed the 1989 constitutional system (in which
FIDESZ also participated), claiming that it was time for a new revolution. This is
why PM Viktor Orbán characterized the results of the 2010 elections as a ‘revo-
lution of the ballot boxes’. His intention with this revolution was to eliminate all
checks and balances, and even the parliamentary rotation of governing parties. His
vision for a new constitutional order—one in which his political party occupies the
centre stage of Hungarian political life and puts an end to debates over values—has
now been entrenched in the new constitution. The paper argues that this current
Hungarian constitutional system was made possible by FIDESZ’ anti-pluralist
nationalist populism, but is not necessarily based on a true commitment to
expressing the will of the people via ‘illiberal constitutionalism’. The populist
government rather misuses the country’s lack of constitutional culture. Adherence to
constitutional patriotism would mean that FIDESZ would have to endorse what
John Rawls once called ‘constitutional essentials’. The core of this kind of con-
stitutional patriotism is a constitutional culture centred on universalist liberal
democratic norms and values. Instead, the current Hungarian constitutional system
is confronted with unconstitutional patriotism, a kind of nationalism that violates
constitutional essentials in the name of ‘national constitutional identity’.
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1 Introduction: Populism and Constitutionalism in East-Central
Europe
The paper deals with recent deviations from the shared values of constitutionalism
towards a kind of ‘populist, illiberal constitutionalism’ introduced by a new
constitution in Hungary. The theoretical question that Hungarian backsliding raises is
whether populism and illiberalism are reconcilable with constitutionalism at all. Due
to my focus on the Hungarian case, I shall concentrate on a particular version of
populism, which is nationalist and illiberal, and mainly present in the countries of
East-Central Europe. Most are also members of the European Union, a value
community based on liberal democratic constitutionalism.1 The arguments set forth
below about East-Central European populist constitutionalism in this paper do not
necessarily apply to other parts of Europe (Greece and Spain), Latin America
(Bolivia) or the USA, where populism has a different character and its relationship to
constitutionalism is distinct from the Hungarian variant, or from the Polish case for
that matter.
I tend to agree with Pierre Rosenvallon, who favours social and economic
inequalities as the main roots of populism2 and differentiates between rightist and
leftist populism. The former is a simplification of social reality, based on the belief
that the glue that holds the majority together is its shared identity, while the latter
adheres to a simplification of economic reality.3 Consequently, rightist populists are
nationalists. They attack non-nationals, such as migrants, and violate principles of
constitutionalism. Leftists, like Syriza in Greece or Podemos in Spain, or Bernie
Sander’s ‘left-wing egalitarianism’ in the USA for that matter, care more about
poverty. Their enemies are the wealthy, the banks, the bourgeoisie, and, at least in
Europe, they pose no threat to constitutionalism.4
I also do not consider political constitutionalism, or all of the concepts rejecting
strong judicial review, or judicial review altogether, as populist.5 Political
constitutionalists, like Richard Bellamy, Jeremy Waldron, Akhil Amar, Sandy
Levinson, and Mark Tushnet, who themselves differ from each other significantly,
emphasize the role of elected bodies instead of courts in implementing and
protecting the constitution, but none of them reject the main principles of
constitutional democracy, as populist do. Even Richard D. Parker, who announced a
1 See a similar description of the new East-Central European populism in a recent paper by Bojan
Bugaric (Bugaric 2017). Bugaric claims that this anti-liberal populism is not necessarily anti-democratic.
In this article, I argue that it is.
2 See Pierre Rosenvallon, Penser Le Populisme, Lecon Inagurale A Collége de France, 18. 2011. Thanks
to Théo Fournier, my PhD researcher at EUI, for drawing my attention to this.
3 Rosenvallon talked about this in a program that aired on Radio France on 2 November 2016. ‘Le
Populisme, Ou Le Retour Des Passions Politiques?’, France Culture https://www.franceculture.fr/
emissions/linvite-des-matins/le-populisme-ou-le-retour-des-passions-politiques [accessed 8 September
2017]. I thank Théo Fournier for bringing this to my attention.
4 This does not necessarily apply to all forms of leftist populism, such as the one in Venezuela both under
President Chávez and Maduro. On the other hand, Evo Morales’ populism involves inclusionary identity
politics, which was also one of the aims for drafting a new constitution for Bolivia. See (D’Eramo 2017,
132).




‘constitutional populist manifesto’ wanted only to challenge the basic idea, central
to constitutional law, ‘that constitutional constrains on public power in a democracy
are meant to contain or tame the exertion of popular political energy rather than to
nurture, galvanize, and release it’.6 Similarly, those who describe a new model of
constitutionalism, based on deliberation between courts and the legislator, with the
latter retaining the final word, have nothing to do with populist constitutionalism.7
Those scholars realize that parliamentary sovereignty tends to be increasingly
restrained, either legally or politically, and that the last decades have witnessed less
and less scope for the exercise of traditional pouvoir constituent, conceived as the
unrestrained ‘will of the people’, even in cases of regime change or the
establishment of substantially and formally new constitutional arrangements
(Fusaro and Oliver 2011). In contrast to these new trends, in the Hungarian
constitutional system, the parliamentary majority not only decides every single issue
without any dialogue, but there is practically no partner for such a dialogue, as the
independence of both the ordinary judiciary and the Constitutional Court has been
silenced.
As Bojan Bugaric argues, populist constitutionalism must also be distinguished
from popular constitutionalism, ‘which seeks to preserve the primary role of the
people in interpretation and administration of constitutional law and is compatible
with liberal democracy.’8
The relationship between populism and constitutionalism has proven difficult to
define. From the large range of definitions of populism, I use the one provided by
Mudde and Kaltwasser, who define populism as a ‘thin-centred ideology that
considers society to be ultimately separated in two homogeneous and antagonistic
camps, ‘‘the pure people’’ and the ‘‘corrupt elite’’, and which argues that politics
should be an expression of the ‘‘volonté générale’’ (general will) of the people’
(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 6). Some scholars argue that populism rejects the
basic principles of constitutional democracy (Pinelli 2016, 6.), understood as limited
6 Analysing Thomas Mann’s novel Mario and the Magician, written in 1929, Parker draws the
conclusion for today that ‘the point is to get out and take part in politics ourselves, not looking down from
a ‘‘higher’’ pedestal, but on the same level with all of the other ordinary people’ (Parker 1993, 583). A
similar message can be detected in the interview with Mark Lilla, a conservative liberal professor of the
humanities at Columbia, who on the day after Donald Trumps presidential victory declared: ‘One of the
many lessons of the recent presidential election and its repugnant outcome is that the age of identity
liberalism must be brought to an end’ (Lilla 2016). Later, in an interview on the topic of the most
effective tools against the President’s populism, he emphasized the importance that opponents find a way
to unify: ‘we have to abandon the rhetoric of difference, in order to appeal to what we share’ (Remnick
2017).
7 See (Gardbaum, 2013) about the new model. This model has also come to be known by several other
names: (1) ‘weak-form of judicial review’ (Tushnet 2003), or just ‘weak judicial review’ (Waldron 2006),
‘the parliamentary bill of rights model’ (Hiebert 2006), ‘the model of democratic dialogue’ (Young
2009), ‘dialogic judicial review’ (Roach 2004), or ‘collaborative constitution’ (Kavanagh 2016).
8 See (Bugaric 2017). Unfortunately, Bugaric does not define popular constitutionalism. Jan-Werner
Müller, who also differentiates between populist and popular constitutionalism, admits that we do not
know exactly what popular constitutionalism is. See Müller (2014). Without exact guidelines one can
think about the Swiss direct democracy, or the (more or less failed) Irish and Icelandic constitutional
reform experiences with strong people’s participation. Abouth these latter attempts see Suiter et al.
(2018), and respectively (Bergsson 2018).
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government, governed by the rule of law, and protecting fundamental rights.9 Luigi
Corrias argues that populism’s mostly implicit constitutional theory contains three
main claims: one concerns the nature of constituent power, the second involves the
scope of popular sovereignty, and the third relates to its approach to constitutional
identity (Corrias 2016).
Regarding constituent power, populists claim not only that it belongs to the
people, but also that it is almost absolute and is potentially being exercised directly
in the polity. The absolute primacy of the constituent power of the people applies
also vis-á-vis the constitution, which is in contradiction with the concept of the
constitution being a ‘higher law’. Unlike liberal constitutionalism, populists claim
not only that the power to create a constitution belongs to the people alone, that is,
that the people have a monopoly over the original or primary pouvoir constituent;
but also the derivative or secondary constitutional amending power, which, for
them, means that the power of the people to amend it is unlimited. This also means
an absolute primacy of politics over law. By not accepting the authority of the law,
populists reject the dualism of law and politics, the common characteristic of both
the American and French revolutions, and the German and British evolutionary
approaches to constituent power (Corrias, 2016, 16).
For popular sovereignty, as Corrias argues, populism holds the belief that ‘the
people’ is a unit, and that, as such, it is present in the polity often only through the
means of direct democracy, such as referenda. Representation merely serves as a
tool to give voice to the unity (Corrias 2016, 18–19). But as Pinelli rightly points
out, contemporary populists do not necessarily reject representation, nor do they
necessarily favour the use of referenda (Pinelli 2016, 11). For instance, Viktor
Orbán’s FIDESZ party tried to undermine the legitimacy of representation after
losing the 2002 parliamentary elections. He refused to concede defeat, declaring that
‘the nation cannot be in opposition, only the government can be in opposition
against its own people’. After the 2010 electoral victory, he claimed that through the
‘revolution at the voting booths’, the majority has delegated its power to the
government representing it. This means that the populist government tried to
interpret the result of the elections as the will of the people, viewed as a
homogenous unit. Also, the Orbán government, which after in 2010 overthrowing
its predecessor as a result of a popular referendum, made it more difficult to initiate
a valid referendum for its own opposition. While the previous law required only
25% of the voters to cast a vote, the new law requires at least 50% of those eligible
to vote to take part, otherwise the referendum is invalid.10 The ambivalence of
populists towards representation and referenda in government and in opposition
applies to their attitude regarding established institutions. While they readily attack
9 See these ‘essential characteristics’ of constitutional democracy in Rosenfeld (2001, 1307).
10 It is the irony of fate that due to these more stringent conditions, the only referendum that the Orbán
government initiated—one against the EU’s migration policy—failed. On 2 October 2016, Hungarian
voters went to the polls to answer one referendum question: ‘Do you want to allow the European Union to
mandate the relocation of non-Hungarian citizens to Hungary without the approval of the National
Assembly?’. Although 92% of those who casted votes and 98 of all the valid votes agreed with the
government, answering ‘no’ (6% were spoiled ballots), the referendum was invalid because the turnout




the ‘establishment’, while in opposition, they very much protect their own
governmental institutions. The situation is different with transnational institutions,
like the EU, which are also attacked by populist governments as threats to their
countries’ sovereignty. A good example is again the Hungarian Parliament’s
reaction to the European Parliament’s critical report from July 2013 on the
constitutional situation in Hungary. The Hungarian parliamentary resolution on
equal treatment reads: ‘We, Hungarians, do not want a Europe any longer where
freedom is limited and not widened. We do not want a Europe any longer where the
Greater abuses his power, where national sovereignty is violated and where the
Smaller has to respect the Greater. We have had enough of dictatorship after
40 years behind the iron curtain’. These words very much reflect the Orbán
government’s view of ‘national freedom’, the liberty of the state (or the nation) to
determine its own laws: ‘This is why we are writing our own constitution…And we
don’t want any unconsolidated help from strangers who are keen to guide
us…Hungary must turn on its own axis’.11
The third element of populist constitutional theory, according to Corrias, is
constitutional identity as collective selfhood. Here populists have the tendency to
reject what they perceive as threats to the constitutional identity of the people by
immigrants, refugees and minorities (Corrias 2016, 13). This is the reason why the
Hungarian government, after the above-mentioned failed referendum, introduced
the Seventh Amendment to defend Hungary’s constitutional identity and politically
legitimize non-compliance with EU law in this area. Since the proposed amendment
fell two votes short of the two-thirds majority required to approve amendments to
the Fundamental Law, the Constitutional Court, loyal to the government, came to
the rescue of Orbán’s constitutional identity defence of its policies on migration.
The Court revived an abandoned petition of the also loyal Commissioner for
Fundamental Rights (hereinafter: Commissioner), filed a year earlier, before the
referendum was initiated, and ruled that ‘the constitutional self-identity of Hungary
is a fundamental value not created by the Fundamental Law—it is merely
acknowledged by the Fundamental Law, consequently constitutional identity cannot
be waived by way of an international treaty’. Therefore, the Court argued, ‘the
protection of the constitutional identity shall remain the duty of the Constitutional
Court as long as Hungary is a sovereign State’. Because sovereignty and
constitutional identity are in contact with each other in many points, ‘their control
should be performed with due regard to each other in specific cases’.12
Paul Blokker understands popular constitutionalism as a form of constitutional
critique and ‘counter-constitutionalism’ rather than an outright denial of liberal
constitutionalism and the rule of law. Similar to Ernesto Laclau’s argument that the
rise of populism is a consequence of the denigration of the masses (Laclau 2005),
Blokker claims that the populist critique of liberal constitutionalism does invoke
11 For the original, Hungarian-language text of Orbán’s speech, entitled Nem leszünk gyarmat! [We
won’t be a colony anymore!] see, e.g. http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/beszed/nem_leszunk_gyarmat_The
English-language translation of excerpts from Orbán’s speech was made available by Hungarian officials,
see, e.g. Financial Times: Brussels Blog, 16 March 2012, at: http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2012/03/the-
eu-soviet-barroso-takes-on-hungarys-orban/?catid=147&SID=google#axzz1qDsigFtC.
12 For a detailed analysis of the decision, see (Halmai 2018).
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relevant critical dimensions of the current democratic malaise, and populists claim
to represent and give voice to the ‘pure’ people (Blokker, Forthcoming). According
to Blokker, this critical stance towards liberal constitutionalism is related to a
Schmittian understanding of the constitution and to Carl Schmitt’s critique of liberal
constitutionalism and its conception of the rule of law. As is well known, the
constitution in Schmitt’s view is an expression of ‘the substantial homogeneity of
the identity and the will of the people’, and guarantee of the state’s existence, and
ultimately any constitutional arrangement is grounded in, or originates from, an
arbitrary act of political power. In other words, in Schmitt’s view the basis of the
constitution is ‘a political decision concerning the type and form of its own being’,
made by the people as a ‘political unity’, based on their own free will. This political
will ‘remains alongside and above the constitution’ (Schmitt, 2008, 125–126).13
Schmitt also portrays the people as an existential reality as opposed to mere liberal
representation of voters in parliament, holding therefore that Mussolini was a
genuine incarnation of democracy.
According to Mudde and Kaltwasser, populists critique elitist, judicial constitu-
tionalism and endorse the participation of ordinary citizens in constitutional politics
(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). In a more recent work, they argue that populism, by
holding that nothing should constrain the ‘the will of the (pure) people’, is
democratic,14 and at odds with liberal democracy, and with the notion of pluralism
(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 81). Although they admit that populism can develop
into illiberal democracy, they also claim that it is not populism but rather nativism
that is the basis for excluding those who they contend are not the ‘real people’
(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 83).15 This understanding of populism presupposes
that democracy can be liberal or illiberal (electoral), the latter having a number of
institutional deficits that hinder respect for the rule of law and exhibit weaknesses in
terms of independent institutions seeking the protection of fundamental rights
(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 88). In fact, Carl Schmitt went so far as to claim the
incompatibility of liberalism and democracy and argued that plebiscitary democracy
based on the homogeneity of the nation was the only true form of democracy.
By contrast, in my view, liberalism is not merely a limit on the public power of
the majority, but also a constitutive precondition for democracy, which provides for
the rule of law, checks and balances, and guaranteed fundamental rights. In this
respect, there is no such a thing as an ‘illiberal democracy’ (Müller 2016a) or for
that matter anti-liberal or non-liberal democracy. Those who perceive democracy as
liberal by definition also claim that populism is inherently hostile to values
13 This idea is also shared by a part of the, otherwise not populist, French constitutional doctrine,
influenced by Rousseau’s general will. This is the reason that the representatives of this doctrine hold that
during a constitutional transition a referendum is sufficient to legitimate a new constitution. See the
French Constitutional Council’s approval of De Gaulle’s 1962 amendment to the 1958 Constitution,
ignoring the Constitution’s amendment provisions. Thanks to Théo Fournier, who called my attention to
this.
14 Also Ruth Gavison calls to celebrate populism as the ‘core of democracy rather than condemn it as
anti-democratic’. She refers to Michael Kazin’s book on The Populist Persuasion (Cornell University
Press, 2017) as a persuasive analysis of populism as an authentic political movement (Gavison 2017).
15 Similarly, Tjitske Akkerman argues that not populism, but authoritarian nationalism, is the real threat




associated with constitutionalism: checks and balances, constraints on the will of the
majority, fundamental rights, and protections for minorities. Those sceptical about
populist constitutionalism have a different understanding of populism, as a distinctly
moral way to understand the political world, which necessarily involves a claim to
exclusive moral representation. This means, as Jan-Werner Müller argues, that this
moralistic vision of politics is not just anti-elitist, but it also and foremost anti-
pluralist (Müller 2016c). But, as Müller also claims, since democracy, which must
be pluralist, is an institutionalized uncertainty, populists destroy democracy itself by
promising certainty through the use of their own constitutions to make their image
of the people and what they regard as the morally right policies as certain as
possible (Müller 2014).16 Another consequence of the exclusionary moral and
ideological position of populism is that it rests on an essentialist concept of
citizenship, which classifies people as citizens who are members of the political
community on the basis of their political and social views or their ideological
commitments, as opposed to the traditional pluralist liberal concept of citizenship
that rests on the place of birth, residence, or the citizenship of parents.17
Interestingly enough, in another of Paul Blokker’s works, he argues that, ‘while
populism can be situated within a modern democratic tradition of constitutionalism,
it produces a distorted version, which leads to an undoing of its democratic potential
and pushes the populist project towards democratic dictatorship’ (Blokker 2017).
According to Blokker, the ‘really existing’ populist constitutionalism, such as those
of Poland and Hungary, is not at all universalistic and inclusionary, and stands in
stark contrast to democratic constitutionalism. In other words, Blokker acknowl-
edges that the distorted Hungarian and Polish populism can lead to ‘democratic
dictatorship’, but it is still considered as a form of constitutionalism, because its key
instrument is the constitution (Blokker 2017).18
In my view, the populist understanding of the constitution opposes limits on the
unity of power, adherence to the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental
rights, as the main components of constitutionalism. The term ‘populist constitu-
tionalism’ seems to me to be an oxymoron altogether. The same applies to
‘authoritarian’ or ‘illiberal’ constitutionalism. If the main characteristic of
constitutionalism is the legally limited power of the government, neither author-
itarian nor illiberal polities can fulfil the requirements of constitutionalism.19 As
16 Müller distinguishes the deeply problematic populist constitutionalism from a legitimate form of
popular constitutionalism. Regarding the distinction, he refers to Brettschneider (2015).
17 Alon Harel argues that in Israel, populism rests on the essentialist characterization of citizenship. See
(Harel 2017).
18 Besides the proposition that a dictatorship can be democratic, also the claim that the use of the
constitution as an instrument is a sufficient condition of constitutionalism is highly contested. While most
of the ‘really existed’ ccommunist regimes used constitutions to legitimise their systems, the current
Polish populist regime, which does not have a two-thirds majority in parliament, uses extra-constitutional
tools to dismantle constitutional democracy.
19 See, for example, the following definition of constitutionalism in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of
Philosophy: ‘Constitutionalism is the idea… that government can and should be legally limited in its
powers, and that its authority or legitimacy depends on its observing these limitations’. (https://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/constitutionalism/). In the legal scholarship, Stephen Holmes asserts that the mini-
malist vision of constitutionalism is achieved if the following requirements are met: the constitution
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Mattias Kumm argues, Carl Schmitt’s interpretation of democracy, inspired by
Rousseau, and used by authoritarian populist nationalists as ‘illiberal democracy’,
becomes an anti-constitutional topos (Kumm 2017). Consequently, I equate
constitutionalism with liberal democratic constitutionalism.20 This does not mean,
however, that constitutions cannot be illiberal or authoritarian. Therefore, it is
legitimate to talk about constitutions in authoritarian regimes, as Tom Ginsburg and
Alberto Simpser do in their book (Ginsburg and Simpser 2014), but I do not agree
with the use of the term ‘authoritarian constitutionalism’ (Tushnet 2013) or
‘constitutional authoritarianism’ (Levitsky and Way 2002). Besides the constitu-
tions in the Communist countries, both current theocratic and communitarian
constitutions are considered as illiberal (Thio 2012).21 Theocratic constitutions, in
contrast to modern constitutionalism, reject secular authority.22 In communitarian
constitutions, like the ones in South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, the well-being of
the nation, the community and society receive utilitarian priority rather than the
individual freedom principle of liberalism. But in these illiberal polities, just like in
the Hungarian one, to be discussed below, there is no constitutionalism.
2 The Hungarian ‘Constitutional Counter-Revolution’ After 2010
Before the 2010 elections, the majority of voters was already dissatisfied not only
with the government, but also with the transition itself—more than in any other
East-Central European country.23 The centre-right FIDESZ strengthened these
feelings by claiming that there had been no real transition in 1989–1990, the
previous nomenclature had merely converted its lost political power into an
economic one, exemplified by the two last prime ministers of the Socialist Party,
who both became rich after the transition due to the privatization process. FIDESZ,
with its tiny Christian democratic coalition partner received more than 50% of the
actual votes, and due to the disproportional election system, received two-thirds of
the seats in the 2010 parliamentary elections. With this overwhelming majority, they
were able to enact a new constitution without the votes of the weak opposition
parties.
Footnote 19 continued
emanates from a political decision and is a set of legal norms; the purpose is ‘to regulate the estab-
lishment and the exercise of public power’; comprehensive regulation; constitution is higher law; con-
stitutional law finds its origin in the people (Holmes 2012).
20 In contrast, others also regard other models of constitutionalism, in which the government, although
committed to acting under a constitution, is not committed to pursuing liberal democratic values. See for
instance (Tushnet 2016). Similarly, Gila Stopler defines the state of the current Israeli constitutional
system as ‘semi-liberal constitutionalism’. Cf. Stopler (2017).
21 Contrary to my understanding, Thio also talks about ‘constitutionalism’ in illiberal polities.
22 There are two subcategories distinguished here: the Iranian, where Islam is granted an authoritative
central role within the bounds of a constitution, and the Saudi Arabian, where Islam is present, without
the formal authority of modern constitutionalism.
23 In 2009, 51% of Hungarians disagreed with the statement that they were better off since the transition,
and only 30% claimed improvements. (In Poland 14% and in the Czech Republic 23% detected




The populism of FIDESZ was directed against all elites, including those who
designed the 1989 constitutional system (in which FIDESZ also took part),
claiming that it was time for a new revolution. That is why Orbán characterized
the results of the 2010 elections as a ‘revolution of the ballot boxes’. His intention
with this revolution was to eliminate any kind of checks and balances, and even
the parliamentary rotation of governing parties. In a September 2009 speech,
Viktor Orbán predicted that there was ‘a real chance that politics in Hungary will
no longer be defined by a dualist power space…. Instead, a large governing party
will emerge in the center of the political stage [that] will be able [to] formulate
national policy, not through constant debates but through a natural representation
of interests.’ Orbán’s vision for a new constitutional order—one in which his
political party occupies the centre stage of Hungarian political life and puts an end
to debates over values—has now been entrenched in a new constitution, enacted
in April 2011. The new constitutional order was built with the votes of his
political bloc alone, and it aims to keep the opposition at bay for a long time. The
new constitutional order of the Fundamental Law and the cardinal laws perfectly
fulfil this plan: they do not recognize the separation of powers and do not
guarantee fundamental rights. Therefore, the new Hungary (not even a Republic in
its name anymore) cannot be considered a liberal constitutional democracy, but
rather an illiberal state.24
In April 2014, FIDESZ, with 44, 5% of the party-list votes, won the elections
again, and due to ‘undue advantages’ for the governing party provided by the
amendment to the electoral system, secured again two-thirds majority. In early
2015, FIDESZ lost its two-thirds majority as a consequence of mid-term elections in
two constituencies, but the far-right Jobbik party received another 20.5% of the
party-list votes. The enemies of liberal democracy still enjoy the support of the
overwhelming majority of the voters, who are not concerned about the backsliding
of constitutionalism. But, as Jan-Werner Müller argues, with reduced media
pluralism and an intimidated civil society, the real ‘popularity’ of the populist
illiberal state has limited meaning. Therefore, we cannot really conclude that
‘illiberal democracy’ became a genuinely popular idea in Hungary, not to speak
about other parts of Europe or the world for that matter (Müller 2017). What we do
know is that since the 1989 democratic transition, the Hungarian people have not yet
24 In an interview on Hungarian public radio on 5 July 2013 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán responded to
European Parliament critics regarding the new constitutional order by admitting that his party did not aim
to produce a liberal constitution. He said: ‘In Europe the trend is for every constitution to be liberal, this is
not one. Liberal constitutions are based on the freedom of the individual and subdue welfare and the
interest of the community to this goal. When we created the constitution, we posed questions to the
people. The first question was the following: what would you like; should the constitution regulate the
rights of the individual and create other rules in accordance with this principle or should it create a
balance between the rights and duties of the individual. According to my recollection more than 80% of
the people responded by saying that they wanted to live in a world, where freedom existed, but where
welfare and the interest of the community could not be neglected and that these need to be balanced in the
constitution. I received an order and mandate for this. For this reason the Hungarian constitution is a
constitution of balance, and not a side-leaning constitution, which is the fashion in Europe, as there are
plenty of problems there’. See A Tavares jelentés egy baloldali akció (The Tavares report is a leftist
action), Interview with PM Viktor Orbán, 5 July 2013. Kossuth Rádió. http://www.kormany.hu/hu/
miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/a-tavares-jelentes-egy-baloldali-akcio.
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subscribed to ‘constitutional patriotism,’25 which would have meant that the citizens
had endorsed what John Rawls once called ‘constitutional essentials,’ and that they
were attached to the idea of a constitution. The core of this kind of constitutional
patriotism is a constitutional culture centred on universalist liberal democratic
norms and values, refracted and interpreted through particular historical experi-
ences. Instead of this, the Hungarian people found themselves confronted with the
populist government’s unconstitutional patriotism, a kind of nationalism that
violates constitutional essentials in the name of ‘national constitutional identity’.26
3 Possible Explanations for Backsliding
The main reasons for the turn away from constitutionalism in Hungary are as
follows:
(a) Historically, in the East-Central European countries, there were only some
unexpected moments—quick flourishes of liberal democracy—followed by
an equally quick acts to de-legitimize them. Examples include the short
period after 1945, until the communist parties’ took over, and after 1989,
when liberal democracy again seemed to be the ‘end of history’.27 Otherwise,
in the national histories of the Central and Eastern European countries,
authoritarianism, such as the pre-1939 authoritarian Hungarian state, has
played a much more important role (Avineri 2009).
As surveys on the links between modernization and democracy show, a
society’s historic and religious heritage leaves a lasting imprint (Inglehart and
Welzel 2010). According to these surveys, the publics of formerly agrarian
societies, including Hungary, emphasize religion, national pride, obedience,
and respect for authority, while the publics of industrial societies emphasize
secularism, cosmopolitanism, autonomy, and rationality (Inglehart and
Welzel 2010, 553).28 Even modernization’s changes are not irreversible:
economic collapse can reverse them, as happened during the early 1990 s in
most former communist states. These findings were confirmed by another
international comparative study conducted by researchers at Jacobs
25 After Dolf Sternberger’s and Jürgen Habermas’ conceptions of constitutional patriotism at the end of
1970s and 1980s, respectively, both of which have been answers to particular German challenges, Jan-
Werner Müller developed a new theory of the term, concentrating on universal norms and constitutional
culture. See Müller (2007).
26 In 2016, the Orbán government argued with Hungary’s ‘national constitutional identity’ to defy the
resolution of European Council to relocate asylum seekers within the Member States of the EU. See
Halmai (2017b).
27 See the results of the research project ‘Negotiating Modernity’: History of Modern Political Thought
in East-Central Europe, led by Balázs Trencsényi, and supported by the European Research Council,
https://erc.europa.eu/‘‘negotiating-modernity’’-history-modern-political-thought-east-central-europe.
28 Christian Welzel in his recent book argues that fading existential pressures open people’s minds,
making them prioritize freedom over security, autonomy over authority, diversity over uniformity and
creativity over discipline, tolerance and solidarity over discrimination and hostility against out-groups. On
the other hand, persistent existential pressures keep people’s mind closed, in which case they emphasize




University in Bremen and published by the German Bertelsmann Founda-
tion.29 According to the study, which examined 34 countries in the EU and
the OECD, Hungary has had a low level of social cohesion ever since the
postcommunist transformation. Social cohesion is defined as the special
quality with which members of a community live and work together. Hungary
was ranked 27th, between Poland and Slovakia.
(b) Even though the transition to democracy in Hungary was driven by the fact
that a large share of the population gave high priority to freedom itself, people
expected the new state to produce speedy economic growth, with which the
country could attain the living standards of the West overnight, without painful
reforms.30 In other words, one can argue that the average Hungarian person
looked to the West as a model in 1989, not so much in terms of its economic
and political systems, but rather in terms of living standards. Claus Offe
predicted the possible backsliding effect of the economic changes and decline
in living standards, warning that this could undermine the legitimacy of
democratic institutions and turn back the process of democratization.31 This
failure, together with the emergence of an economically and politically
independent bourgeoisie, the accumulation of wealth by some former
members of the communist nomenclature, unresolved issues in dealing with
the communist past, the lack of retributive justice against perpetrators of grave
human rights violations, and a mild vetting procedure and lack of restitution of
the confiscated properties, were reasons for disappointment.
Trying to explain the attitudes of voters who support authoritarian, populist
leaders, such as Orbán, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, suggest that it
would be a mistake to attribute the rise of populism directly to economic
inequality alone, as psychological factors seem to play an even more important
role. Older and less-educated people tend to support populist parties and
leaders that defend traditional cultural values and emphasize nationalistic and
xenophobia agendas, reject outsiders and uphold old-fashioned gender roles
(Inglehart and Norris 2016).
(c) According to some authors, the prospects for democracy in the newly
independent states of Central and Eastern Europe following the 1989–1990
transition were diminished by a technocratic, judicial control of politics,
which blunted the development of civic constitutionalism, civil society and
participatory democratic government as necessary counterpoints to the
technocratic machinery of legal constitutionalism.32 Adherents to this
viewpoint argue that the legalistic form of constitutionalism (or legal
constitutionalism), while consistent with the purpose of creating the structure
29 Schiefer et al. (2013).
30 As Ulrich Preuss argues, the satisfaction of the basic economic needs of the populace was so important
for both the ordinary people and the new political elites that constitutions did not really make a difference.
See Preuss (1993, 3).
31 Cf. Offe (1994, 15).
32 See this argument in Blokker (2013). Also Wojciech Sadurski argued that legal constitutionalism
might have a ‘negative effect’ in new democracies and might lead to the perpetuation of the problem of
both weak political parties and civil society. See Sadurski (2005).
Is There Such Thing as ‘Populist Constitutionalism’? The…
123
Author's personal copy
of the state and setting boundaries between the state and citizens, jeopardizes
the development of participatory democracy.33 In other words, legal
constitutionalism falls short, reducing the Constitution to an elite instrument,
especially in countries with weak civil societies and weak political party
systems that undermine a robust constitutional democracy based on the idea
of civic self-government (Sadurski 2005, 23).
The concept of civic or participatory constitutionalism is based on
‘democratic constitutionalism’ (James Tully), emphasizing that structural
problems in new democracies include the relative absence of institutions for
popular participation, which is also related to ‘counterdemocracy’ (Pierre
Rosenvallon), as well as a robust institutional linkage between civic
associations and citizens and formal politics. Critics of this approach say
that it does not sufficiently take into account the rise of populism and the
lack of civic interest in constitutional matters. Moreover, the approach does
not account for the increasing irrelevance of domestic constitutionalism
resulting from the tendencies of Europeanization and globalization,
especially the internationalization of domestic constitutional law through
the use of foreign and international law in constitution-making and
constitutional interpretation.34
(d) There was also a lack of consensus about liberal democratic values at the time
of the transition. In the beginning of the democratic transitions in these new
democracies, preference was given to general economic effectiveness over
mass civic and political engagement.35 The satisfaction of basic economic
needs was so important for both ordinary people and the new political elites
that constitutions did not really make a difference.36 Between 1989 and 2004
all political forces accepted a certain minimalistic version of a ‘liberal
consensus’ understood as a set of rules and laws rather than values, according
to which NATO and EU accession was the main political goal. But as soon as
the main political goals were achieved, the liberal consensus died (Krastev
2007), and full democratic consolidation was never achieved (Dawson and
Hanley 2016).
33 See Albert (2008).
34 See the reviews on Blokker (2013) by Jiri Priban and Bogusia Puchalska in ICONnect. www.
iconnectblog.com/2013/09/book-reviewresponse-paul-blokker-jiri-priban-and-bogusia-puchalska-on-
civic-constitutionalism.
35 Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits state that East-Central European democracies had a ‘hollow core’
at their inception. See Bohle and Greskovits (2012).




4 Conclusion: The State of Constitutionalism in Hungary
In Hungary, the system of governance became populist, illiberal and undemo-
cratic37; this was PM Orbán openly stated intention.38 The backsliding has happened
through the use of ‘abusive constitutional’ tools: constitutional amendments and
even replacements, because both the internal and the external democratic defence
mechanisms against the abuse of constitutional tools failed.39 The internal ones
(constitutional courts, judiciary) failed because the new regime managed to abolish
all checks on their power, and the international ones, such as the EU toolkits, mostly
due to the lack of a joint political will to use them.
In this populist, illiberal system the institutions of a constitutional state (the
constitutional court, ombudsman, judicial or media councils) still exist, but their
power is very limited. Also, as in many illiberal regimes, fundamental rights are
listed in the constitutions, but the institutional guarantees of these rights are
endangered through the lack of an independent judiciary and constitutional court.
To be clear, if the competences of the constitutional courts were very strong in the
beginning of the transition, they can be weakened provided that they still are able to
fulfil their function as a check on governmental power, or if other control
mechanisms exist.
Although Hungary became a liberal democracy on an institutional level Hungary
after 1989, on a behavioural level, the consolidation of the system has always been
37 As Jan-Werner Müller rightly argues, it is not just liberalism that is under attack in these two countries,
but democracy itself. Hence, instead of calling them ‘illiberal democracies’ we should describe them as
illiberal and ‘undemocratic’ regimes. See Müller (2016a).
38 In a speech delivered on 26 July 2014 before an ethnic Hungarian audience in neighbouring Romania,
Orbán proclaimed his intention to turn Hungary into a state that ‘will undertake the odium of expressing
that in character it is not of liberal nature’. Citing as models he added: ‘We have abandon liberal methods
and principles of organizing society, as well as the liberal way to look at the world… Today, the stars of
international analyses are Singapore, China, India, Turkey, Russia…. and if we think back on what we did
in the last four years, and what we are going to do in the following four years, than it really can be
interpreted from this angle. We are… parting ways with Western European dogmas, making ourselves
independent from them…If we look at civil organizations in Hungary,…we have to deal with paid
political activists here…[T]hey would like to exercise influence… on Hungarian public life. It is vital,
therefore, that if we would like to reorganize our nation state instead of the liberal state, that we should
make it clear, that these are not civilians… opposing us, but political activists attempting to promote
foreign interests…. This is about the ongoing reorganization of Hungarian state. Contrary to the liberal
state organization logic of the past twenty years, this is a state organization originating in national
interests’. See the full text of Viktor Orbán’s speech here: http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-
text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/.
39 The category of ‘abusive constitutionalism’ was introduced by David Landau using the cases of
Colombia, Venezuela and Hungary. See Landau (2013). Abusive constitutional tools are known from the
very beginning of constitutionalism. The recent story of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal is reminiscent
of the events in the years after the election of Jefferson, as the first anti-federalist President of the USA.
On 2 March 1801, the second-to-last day of his presidency, President Adams appointed judges, most of
whom were federalists. The federalist Senate confirmed them the next day. As a response, Jefferson, after
taking office, convinced the new anti-federalist Congress to abolish the terms of the Supreme Court that
were to take place in June and December of that year, and Congress repealed the law passed by the
previous Congress creating new federal judgeships. In addition, the anti-federalist Congress had begun
impeachment proceedings against some federalist judges. About the election of 1800 and its aftermath,
see Ackerman (2007).
Is There Such Thing as ‘Populist Constitutionalism’? The…
123
Author's personal copy
very fragile. If one considers liberalism as not merely a limit on the public power of
the majority, but as also a concept that encompasses the constitutive precondition of
democracy—the rule of law, checks and balances, and guaranteed fundamental
rights—then Hungary is not a liberal democracy anymore. Since the 2010 victory of
the current governing FIDESZ party, all of the public power is in the hands of the
representatives of one party. Freedom of the media and religious rights, among
others, are seriously curtailed. And before the 2014 parliamentary elections, the
electoral system became unfair, ensuring again a two-thirds majority for FIDESZ in
the Hungarian parliament.
The problem with the Hungarian populist and illiberal constitutional system is
that the country is currently a member of the European Union, which considers itself
to be a union based on the principles of liberal democratic constitutionalism. Of
course, the citizens of Hungary, as any other citizens of a democratic nation-state,
have the right to oppose joint European measures, for instance on immigration and
refugees, or even the development of a liberal political system altogether. However,
this conclusion must be reached through a democratic process. There are still a
significant number of people who either consider themselves to be supporters of
liberal democracy, or at least represent views which are in line with liberal
democracy. But if Hungarians ultimately opt for a non-liberal system, they must
accept certain consequences, including parting from the European Union and the
wider community of liberal democracies.
The behaviour of the Hungarian government, supported by the other three
Visegrád countries, among them Poland during the refugee crisis, has taught us that
the strengthening of populist and extreme nationalist movements across Europe is
incompatible with the values of liberal democratic constitutionalism. We have also
learned that membership in the European Union is not a guarantee for maintaining
the liberal democratic regimes in all Member States. Unfortunately, an outsized fear
of threats, physical and social, lately, for instance, the refugee crisis, strengthened
populist illiberal systems, such as Turkey and authoritarian regimes, such as Russia
all over Europe. The same tendency can be observed in the case of Hungary even
inside the EU,40 not to mention the consequences of the Trump presidency in the
USA.41 The division between the old and the new Member States has been
strengthened, but the support of the far-right parties has been increased even in the
old Member States.42 Since the EU institutions have proven incapable of enforcing
compliance with core European values at least one populist/illiberal Member State
40 At a conference in the Polish town of Krynica in mid-September 2016, Orbán and Kaczyński
proclaimed a ‘cultural counter-revolution’ aimed at turning the European Union into an illiberal project.
A week later at the Bratislava EU summit, the prime ministers of the Visegrád 4 countries demanded a
structural change of the EU in favour of the nation states. Slawomir Sierakowski even speaks about an
‘illiberal international’. See Sierakowski (2016).
41 The success of Donald Trump, an authoritarian presidential candidate in the USA, can be explained
with the same reasons. See Taub (2016). About the socio-psychological causes of authoritarianism, see
Bob Altemeyer’s work, which is based on Adorno’s ‘fascist personality concept explains the
‘authoritarian personality’ with authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism.
Cf. Altemeyer (1998) [I’m confused here].
42 Regarding the constitutional crisis of the EU, Michael Wilkinson draws attention to the dangers of




has emerged in the EU, which cannot be considered as a constitutional democracy
anymore. The current Hungarian constitutional system was made possible by
FIDESZ’ anti-pluralist nationalist populism, but one can hope that it is not
necessarily based on a true commitment of the people to anti-constitutionalist ideas,
and the populist government was only able to misuse the country’s lack of
constitutional culture.
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